Ethiopia had long wanted to build a dam on the Nile River but could only achieve this goal recently. The dam Ethiopia is building could threaten Egypt by reducing its share of Nile water and decreasing the electricity generated by the High Dam. That’s the summary of the issue. Now, let’s talk in detail about the story from the beginning:
The Origin of the Story:
The Nile River has two main branches: the White Nile, which comes from the Great Lakes region in Central Africa (Uganda and Tanzania), and it’s not very beneficial to Egypt because of evaporation and water loss along its path. The second branch is the Blue Nile, which comes from Ethiopia and accounts for about 86% of Egypt’s share of the Nile water. The White Nile and Blue Nile meet in Khartoum, Sudan, then split again at Damietta and Rosetta as they enter Egypt.
Previous Agreements:
Since the British occupation in 1902, Egypt has had agreements that prevent the construction of projects on the Nile River that would affect its water share. These agreements were revised and updated in 1906 and 1929, setting Egypt’s share of the Nile water at 92.3% and granting Egypt the right to veto any projects on the Nile’s tributaries.
Ethiopia’s Challenges and Projects:
Ethiopia has suffered from drought and famine due to the lack of water storage facilities like Lake Nasser in Egypt. So, in 1956, Ethiopia started thinking about building a dam on the Blue Nile to store water and generate electricity. Ethiopia sought the help of the U.S. State Department at that time, and in 1964, the U.S. identified the most suitable site for the dam.
Negotiation Developments:
In 1999, several Nile Basin countries initiated projects on the Nile. Still, Egypt firmly rejected them due to its veto right and because it considered itself the most significant and robust country in the Nile Basin.
Ethiopia’s Attempts:
Despite building several small dams, Ethiopia could only provide electricity to 9% of its population. So, the new dam was a golden opportunity for them to generate electricity and sell it to neighboring countries, with Egypt being a potential buyer, according to the Ethiopian government’s proposal.
The Start of the Dam Construction:
In 2009, Ethiopia began conducting geographical surveys and designing the proposed dam. 2010, Ethiopia signed several African agreements without Egypt and Sudan’s presence. That same year, Egypt tried to file a complaint with the United Nations to prevent dam funding and compel Ethiopia to cooperate.
Contract with the Italian Company:
In 2011, Ethiopia announced a $4.8 billion contract with a major Italian company to build the dam. The funding came from the government, citizen donations, and undisclosed support from other countries, such as Israel, which has close ties with Ethiopia.
Morsi’s Era and Negotiations:
No agreement was reached regarding the dam during Morsi's era. Despite his visits to Ethiopia and meetings with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, no significant progress was made. After a leaked secret meeting, Morsi suggested bombing the dam or supporting the Ethiopian opposition, further deteriorating relations.
Sisi’s Era:
In January 2014, Sisi’s government began new negotiations with the Ethiopian side, but they failed. Ethiopia announced that it would not stop the dam’s construction. In March 2014, Egypt signed an agreement that included ten principles regarding the Renaissance Dam, but the agreement did not include technical aspects that would guarantee no harm to Egypt.
Technical Risks of the Dam for Egypt:
Reservoir Size: The dam will take between 63 to 74 billion cubic meters of water, equivalent to Egypt and Sudan’s share in a whole year.
Agriculture: Egypt will be affected by the water shortage, which will reduce its water share by about 10 to 12 billion cubic meters.
Electricity: The dam could slow down the flow of water, which might affect electricity production from the High Dam.
Military Consequences: If Egypt attempts to bomb the dam after it starts operating, a large flood could occur in Egypt.
Current Situation:
In March, Sisi signed an agreement with ten principles concerning the Renaissance Dam. Still, Ethiopia remained adamant and refused to stop the dam’s construction or commit to any guarantees to protect Egypt. The current situation reflects a significant decline in Egypt’s regional position, opening the door for other Nile Basin countries to build projects that could affect Egypt’s water share.
Conclusion:
The Renaissance Dam represents a significant challenge for Egypt, both in terms of water and electricity. The available solutions are limited, and ongoing negotiations have yet to yield a solution that satisfies all parties. The situation requires continuous monitoring and serious steps to protect Egypt’s rights to the Nile water.